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ABSTRACT: Given the sheer vastness of the totality of contemporary human knowledge 
and our individual epistemic finitude it is commonplace for those of us who lack 
knowledge with respect to some proposition(s) to appeal to experts (those who do have 
knowledge with respect to that proposition(s)) as an epistemic resource. Of course, much 
ink has been spilled on this issue and so concern here will be very narrowly focused on 
testimony in the context of epistemological views that incorporate evidentialism and 
internalism, and which are either reductivist or non-reductivist in nature. Also, as the 
main question about testimony addressed here is whether or not testimony can provide 
any basic justification at all, attention will be narrowly focused on the simple case where 
one is presented with testimony that something is the case from only one source and on 
one occasion. It turns out that there are some seriously odd epistemic features of such 
appeals to expertise that arise both for those who intend to accept internalism, 
evidentialism and reductivism about justification by testimony and for those who intend 
to accept internalism, evidentialism and non-reductivism about justification by 
testimony.  
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1. Introduction 
Given the sheer vastness of the totality of contemporary human knowledge and 
our individual epistemic finitude it is commonplace for those of us who lack 
knowledge with respect to some proposition(s) to appeal to experts (those who do 
have knowledge with respect to that proposition(s)) as an epistemic resource. Of 
course, much ink has been spilled on this issue and so concern here will be very 
narrowly focused on testimony in the context of epistemological views that 
incorporate evidentialism and internalism, and which are either reductivist or 
non-reductivist in nature.1 Also, as the main question about testimony addressed 
                                                                
1 See, for example C. A. J. Coady, Testimony (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), Elizabeth Fricker, 
‘The Epistemology of Testimony,” Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society 61 (1987): 57-84, 
Jonathan E. Adler, “Transmitting Knowledge,” Noûs 30 (1996): 99-111, Tyler Burge, “Content 
Preservation,” The Philosophical Review 102 (1993): 457-488, “Interlocution, Perception and 
Memory,” Philosophical Studies 86 (1997): 21, and John Hardwig, “The Role of Trust in 
Knowledge,” The Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 693-708. 
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here is whether or not testimony can provide any basic justification at all, 
attention will be narrowly focused here on the simple case where one is presented 
with testimony that something is the case from only one source and on one 
occasion. It turns out that there are some seriously odd epistemic features of such 
appeals to expertise that arise both for those who intend to accept internalism, 
evidentialism and reductivism about justification by testimony and for those who 
intend to accept internalism, evidentialism and non-reductivism about 
justification by testimony.  
Following Conee and Feldman’s insightful analysis, internalists are, 
typically, accessibilists and mentalists.2 Briefly, internalism is the view that one’s 
justificatory status is a function of states internal to the epistemic agent. 
Accessibilism is the view that epistemic agents have some sort of privileged access 
to those states that justify the agent’s beliefs, and mentalism is the view that 
justifiers are mental items. Evidentialisim is the view, derived from Locke, Hume 
and Clifford, that one should never believe anything on the basis of insufficient 
evidence.3 The conjunction of evidentialism and internalism then yields the view 
that one should never believe anything without sufficient internally accessible, 
mental, evidence. Non-reductivism, as it will be understood here, is just the view, 
derived from Reid, that testimony is a basic source of justification in the sense that 
it can generate justification and that such justification does not depend on 
knowledge of the frequency of veracity of testimony. The later condition is crucial 
for if testimony did require such knowledge, then it would be dependent on 
induction and thus would ipso facto not be a basic, justification-generating, 
source. Reductivism will then be understood here to be the view that testimonial 
justification requires knowledge of the frequency of the veracity of testimony and 
so on this view the justificatory status of testimony is parasitic on the justificatory 
status of induction. In light of the problem that these views face concerning the 
probativity of simple testimony it will be suggested either that externalism allows 
for a much more reasonable account of the epistemic role of testimony and appeals 
to expertise in the generation and maintenance of knowledge, or that testimony 
may simply not be justification-generating at all. 
 
                                                                
2 Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, “Internalism Defended,” in Epistemology: Internalism and 
Externalism, ed. Hilary Kornblith (Malden: Blackwell, 2001). 
3 See Jonathan E. Adler, “The Ethics of Belief: Off the Wrong Track,” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 23 (1999): 267-285, Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, Evidentialism (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2004) and Trent Dougherty, ed., Evidentialism and its Discontents (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) for perspectives on evidentialism. 
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2. Grave Decisions, Ignorance and Testimony 
Consider a typical and simple kind of case where agent A lacks knowledge of some 
proposition p, or KAp. For example, let us suppose that John does not know if 
Amanita phalloides is poisonous or not, and that he desires to resolve this issue 
because he needs to know if he can safely ingest a large example of that fungi. So, 
relative to his question concerning the toxicity of that variety of mushroom, John 
wants to bring it about that either KJohn(Amanita phalloides is poisonous) or 
KJohn(Amanita phalloides is poisonous). Further suppose that John is smart 
enough not to simply eat the mushroom in order to acquire direct evidence 
concerning its toxicity. As a result of his ignorance, let us then suppose that John 
consults a person supposed to be expert mycologist, Mike.4 Mike, being an expert 
knows that Amanita phalloides, the death cap, causes cyclopeptide poisoning 
which can result in death and which is characterized by the following gruesome 
pathology: 
(i) A long latent period of up to 24 hours between the ingestion of the 
mushrooms prior to the onset of the first symptoms. 
(ii) The occurrence of diarrhea, abdominal cramps, nausea and vomiting.  
(iii) A 24 hour period of remission of the symptoms noted in (ii), followed by 
(iv) possible liver and kidney failure, and consequent death.5 
So, ex hypothesi, KMike (Amanita phalloides is poisonous) and KJohn 
(Amanita phalloides is poisonous).  
Consider, however, John’s epistemic position in this typical kind of appeal 
to expertise and where we keep in mind that John is utterly ignorant of the 
answer to his question. If he is, in fact, utterly ignorant of the correct answer 
concerning the toxicity of Amanita phalloides, then he presumably seeks the 
advice of Mike because John believes that Mike knows the correct answer, i.e. that 
                                                                
4 So in this case we have what Alvin Goldman refers to as a case of novice/expert testimony. 
Discussion here shall be, for the most part, limited to these sorts of cases. Also, as the concern 
here is with the simple question of whether single case testimony can ever justify belief, we will 
not be concerned with cases where the novice is faced with multiple sources that assert p. This 
issue is addressed at length in Alvin I. Goldman, “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?’ 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Rersearch 63 (2001): 85-110 and in George N. Schlesinger, 
“Why a Twice Told Tale is More Likely to Take Hold,” Philosophical Studies 54 (1988): 141-152 
and L. Jonathan Cohen, “Twice Told Tales: A Reply to Schlesinger,” Philosophical Studies 
(1991): 197-200. 
5 See Gary Lincoff. Toxic and Hallucinogenic Mushroom Poisoning: A Handbook for Physicians 
and Mushroom Hunters (New York: Van Nostrand, 1977). 
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BJohn[KMike(Amanita phalloides is poisonous)  KMike(Amanita phalloides is 
poisonous)]. But, it is also clearly true in this example, following Hintikka, that 
KJohnKMike(Amanita phalloides is poisonous) because if he did, then he would not 
be ignorant of the matter of the toxicity of Amanita phalloides. Hintikka’s 
principle that underwrites this is as follows: 
(HP) KAKBp  KAp.6 
For the purpose of clarity, keep in mind, also, the contrapositive of HP: 
(CHP) KAp  KAKBp. 
HP is a desirable principle to satisfy as it implies that if A knows that B 
knows that p, then A knows that p and A then knows that B is an expert 
concerning p. However, with respect to the case we have been considering, if John 
knew that Mike knew that Amanita phalloides is poisonous then John would 
know that Mike knows that Amanita phalloides is poisonous is true. 
Consequently, since on the standard analysis of knowledge we cannot know what 
is false John would know that Amanita phalloides is poisonous. However, ex 
hypothesi, he does not know that Amanita phalloides is poisonous and so he does 
not know that Mike knows that Amanita phalloides is poisonous as is made 
especially clear by CHP.  
However, it does not seem obviously necessary that John needs to satisfy 
HP with respect to the proposition that Amanita phalloides is poisonous in order 
to know that Mike is an expert and, hence, to make it rational to rely on Mike’s 
testimony. So the following rationality condition for testimony is too strong: 
(T1) If agent A is rational in relying on B’s assertion that p, then KAKBp. 
All that John appears to need to know is that Mike knows whether or not 
Amanita phalloides is poisonous, i.e. KJohn[KMike(Amanita phalloides is poisonous)  
KMike(Amanita phalloides is poisonous)]. Consider then the follow condition on 
the rationality of relying on testimony: 
(T2) If agent A is rational in relying on B’s assertion that p, then KA(KBp  KBp). 
First, we must note, however, that T2 is clearly still unreasonably strong as 
requiring A to know that B knows whether or not p is true would rule out 
virtually every actual appeal to expert testimony on the grounds that we are rarely 
justified in believing such things to the degree that they count as bona fide 
knowledge. 
                                                                
6 Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 61. Also, see 
Adler, “The Ethics of Belief” for a defense of a slightly modified version of HP. 
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So let us consider the more important and much weaker claim: 
BJohn[KMike(Amanita phalloides is poisonous)  KMike(Amanita phalloides is 
poisonous)], that John merely believes that Mike knows whether or not Amanita 
phalloides is poisonous. This is a reasonable rendering of the claim that John 
believes that Mike is an expert concerning the toxicity of Amanita phalloides. We 
can then weaken T2 as follows: 
(T3) If agent A is rational in relying on B’s assertion that p, then BA(KBp  KBp). 
Suppose then that Mike were to tell John that Amanita phalloides is 
poisonous and John satisfies T3 with respect to the proposition that Mike is an 
expert. Recalling also that BJohnKMike(Amanita phalloides is poisonous)  
BJohnKMike(Amanita phalloides is poisonous), that John believes neither than 
Mike knows it is poisonous or that it is not poisonous, we then know, at least, the 
following list of relevant facts about our situation: 
1. Amanita phalloides is poisonous.  
2. KJohn(Amanita phalloides is poisonous). 
3. KJohn(Amanita phalloides is poisonous). 
4. KMike(Amanita phalloides is poisonous). 
5. BJohn[KMike(Amanita phalloides is poisonous)  KMike(Amanita phalloides is 
poisonous)]. 
6. BJohnKMike(Amanita phalloides is poisonous).  
7. BJohnKMike(Amanita phalloides is poisonous). 
8. Mike tells John that Amanita phalloides is poisonous. 
At least prima facie it should be clear that John’s mere, unsupported, belief 
is not sufficient to rationally establish that Mike really is an expert on this matter 
and that T3 is thus too weak to support the contention that given 1-8, internalism 
and evidentialism John knows that Amanita phalloides is poisonous. If John is 
rational in appealing to Mike’s expertise and thus can come to know or believe 
justifiably based on Mike’s testimony, then John must have some sort of 
justification, either of the reductive or non-reductive sort, for his belief that Mike 
is really an expert on this issue.  
In the immediate case at hand, it is easy to see why this is so. As far as John 
knows, Mike’s testimony is no more liable to be correct than that of a randomly 
selected person from the population and, given the potential gravity of his choice, 
he needs to especially careful in formulating his belief. Pace Burge and Hardwig 
then, according to most reductivists it would (at least prima facie) seem that is not 
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enough that John simply trusts Mike without some reason to believe that Mike is 
knowledgeable about the toxicity or non-toxicity of Amanita phalloides if he is to 
come to have bona fide knowledge on the basis of Mike’s testimony, at least if one 
wants to retain some standard form of evidentialism.7 Moreover, from a practical 
perspective, it would seem that John should not blindly trust Mike as if Mike is 
wrong John may die a horrible death.8 But, as we saw earlier, it is also 
unreasonable to require that John know that Mike is an expert. What we can 
reasonably expect, however, is that, in accord with evidentialism, John’s belief 
that Mike is an expert must be justified, JBJohn[KMike(Amanita phalloides is 
poisonous)  KMike(Amanita phalloides is poisonous)], and that his belief is so 
justified by sufficient evidence e. This yields the following rationality condition 
for accepting testimony: 
(T4) If agent A is rational in relying on B’s assertion that p, then there is 
sufficient evidence e available to A and relevant to BA(KBp  KBp) such that 
JBA(KBp  KBp) on the basis of e. 
But, problems then begin to creep up on those who wish to defend 
evidentialism, internalism and the view that testimony provides justification. 
These problems can be made acute by pondering the following question. What 
internally accessible mental items of evidence, i.e. what beliefs, could John 
conceivably have that would make it rational for him to regard Mike as an expert 
on the specific issue of the toxicity or non-toxicity of Amanita phalloides, and 
which would allow John to satisfy T4 with respect to that issue from his position 
of complete ignorance? In looking at this question, it will be shown that given 
internalism and evidentialism, the only plausible ways to satisfy T4 in such 
circumstances would require either satisfying HP, thereby rendering the appeal to 
expert testimony in such epistemic systems paradoxically superfluous, or by 
ceding the standard form of evidentialism and thus inviting incoherence. The 
former problem arises for reductivists because such testimony sufficiently 
supported by evidence will run afoul of HP. The latter problem arises for non-
reductivists like Burge who hold that justificatory dependence on testimony is 
warranted a priori and thus cannot be evidential in the standard sense.9 
 
                                                                
7 See Burge, “Content Preservation,” “Interlocution, Perception,” and Hardwig, “The Role of 
Trust.” 
8 See Elizabeth Fricker, “Against Gullibility,” in Knowing from Words, eds. Bimal K. Matilal and 
A. Chakrabarti (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994) for a related point. 
9 Burge, “Content Preservation,” “Interlocution, Perception.” 
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3. The Failure of Internalist Evidentialist Reductivism 
Clearly John’s internal evidence cannot be that Mike has correctly answered 
John’s question concerning the toxicity of Amanita phalloides in the past (either 
by demonstration or by having told John) and, hence, that John knows that 
Amanita phalloides is toxic in accord with HP, because then John would then 
already know or be justified in believing that Amanita phalloides is poisonous. 
Again, ex hypothesi, he neither knows nor is justified in believing this. Moreover, 
John’s evidence cannot be testimonial evidence about Mike’s expertise either 
without inviting a viscous regress with respect to Mike’s testimony that Amanita 
phalloides is poisonous.10 To see the latter point suppose that Jim tells John that 
Mike is an expert on the matter of the toxicity of Amanita phalloides. So suppose 
that KJohn{KJim[KMike(Amanita phalloides is poisonous)  KMike(Amanita phalloides 
is poisonous)]}. But on what basis can John reasonably believe what Jim says? The 
natural answer is that Jim possesses some relevant expertise, i.e. knowledge 
concerning Mike’s mycological expertise and that Jim’s testimony establishes this. 
So we might suppose that John’s belief about Jim’s testimony settles the issue. 
However, because John does not know anything about Amanita phalloides this 
prevents him from being able to justify his belief that Mike is an expert with 
respect to Amanita phalloides without further appeal to authority, his ignorance 
also obviously prevents him from knowing that Jim is a good judge of Mike’s 
expertise qua Amanita phalloides. How, absent knowledge of the relevant matter 
of fact concerning Amanita phalloides, could John be sure that Jim knows that 
Mike possesses the relevant knowledge in question?  
The best that we could say is that BJohn{KJim[KMike(Amanita phalloides is 
poisonous)  KMike(Amanita phalloides is poisonous)]}, but this is not sufficient 
given the normal internalist concept of justification to make John’s appeal to Mike 
rational without having good reasons to support John’s appeal to Jim and these 
reasons cannot be either further testimony about Jim (say that of Diane) if one is a 
reductivist or reasons that imply that John knows or is justified in believing that 
Amanita phalloides is poisonous. So it seems that if John is ignorant with respect 
to the issue of the toxicity of Amanita phalloides, then it appears to be impossible 
for him to coherently appeal to testimony in a way that would yield an 
epistemically satisfactory, i.e. justified, answer to his query on reductivist and 
internalist theories of justification so understood. In other words for internalist 
                                                                
10 See Frederick F. Schmitt, “Justification, Sociality and Autonomy,” Synthese 73 (1987): 43-85 
for a similar point. 
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evidentialists of the reductivist sort it seems as if one must already know the fact 
in question if one is to be justified in appealing to expert authority. 
To put it more clearly, what John would need to know is that Jim’s (expert) 
testimony concerning Mike’s mycological knowledge that is supposed to establish 
the expertise of Mike on the matter of the toxicity of Amanita phalloides is likely 
to be true. But, if John cannot tell whether Mike is really an expert because he is 
ignorant of the toxicity of Amanita phalloides, then he will also not be able to tell 
if Jim’s claim that Mike is an expert concerning the toxicity of Amanita phalloides 
is warranted. As a result, it seems clear that testimony cannot be a basic epistemic 
source for internalist evidentialists of this sort as iterated appeals to testimony 
invite viscous regress absent some knowledge, or justified belief, concerning the 
proposition in question. The only apparent source of evidence that could justify 
John’s belief that Mike is an expert on this sort of internalist evidentialist view 
would be for him to acquire Mike’s knowledge about Amanita phalloides thus, 
paradoxically, rendering the appeal to expertise epistemically superfluous.  
This crucial point can be seen most easily by employing the standard 
probabilistic account of confirming evidence. Suppose that John acquires 
confirming evidence e for the belief that Mike is an expert about (p p). 
Evidence e then will have to be evidence that Mike is to be relied on in the matter 
of (p p). So JBJohn(KMikep  KMikep) because, where TMikep is the claim that 
Mike’s testimony that p is true, P(TMikepe)  P(TMikep) and so e confirms TMikep. 
Suppose also that Mike’s testimony is evidential, such that his telling John that p is 
evidence for John’s belief that p. So P(pTMikep)  P(p) and so TMikep confirms p. If 
both of these things are true, then it is a trivial result of the probability calculus 
that P(pe)  P(p) and that e confirms p. As a result, if JBJohn(KMikep  KMikep) on 
the basis of evidence e, given the only legitimate candidates for what e could be 
HP will be satisfied in a way that makes Mike’s testimony superfluous. This is not, 
of course, terribly surprising given a reductivist view of testimony and given 
Bayes’ theorem.  
Bayes theorem can be usefully formulated as follows: P(pe) = 
P(p)P(ep)/P(e). Consider the case at hand. We have P(pTMikep) 
=P(p)P(TMikepp)/P(TMikep). Assuming that 8 is true P(TMikep) = 1, and assuming 
that 2 and 3 are true P(p) = .5. Substituting we get the following expression: 
P(pTMikep) =.5P(TMikepp). In accordance with the reductivist view, it is then 
clear that the reasonableness of John’s believing that p on the basis of Mike’s 
testimony hinges entirely on the value of P(TMikepp) and thus on John’s evidence 
that Mike is a reliable guide to the truth that p. By the definition of conditional 
probability and substitution, P(TMikepp) = P(TMikep & p)/.5. Substituting we then 
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get P(pTMikep) = P(TMikep & p). Given the reductivist view that testimony is not 
independently probative the value of P(TMikep & p) will then reduce to P(p) 
because on this view TMikep and p will be probabilistically independent. Mike’s 
telling John that p is true has no evidential significance with respect to p. Relative 
to John, who is ex hypothesi ignorant about p, P(p) = .5 and any rational, i.e. 
probabilistically coherent, alteration in that value will be the result of John’s own 
direct evidence e that p is true, or P(pe). On the reductivist view all of the 
confirmatory work then will be done by the evidence e that John has for p simply 
because confirmation is transitive and the effect of TMikep simply falls out because 
it is not independently probative. Perhaps disturbingly, this throws into question 
relatively substantial portions of our system of supposed knowledge as we 
regularly rely on epistemic authority without acquiring the relevant knowledge 
possessed by the relevant experts, without acquiring the direct justifications for 
our beliefs in propositions vouched for by supposed experts.  
One possible and even then only partial solution open to internalist 
evidentialists of this sort is that John’s belief that Mike is an expert qua the 
toxicity of Amanita phalloides can be supported by John’s having directly acquired 
justified beliefs, say via perception, about Mike’s expertise on closely related 
issues, such as his knowledge of the toxicity of, for example, Amanita bisporigera, 
which is also toxic. This sort of appeal would include appealing to inductive 
evidence concerning Mike’s expertise as if John is really ignorant of the facts 
concerning the toxicity of Amanita phalloides, then his prior evidence concerning 
Mike’s expertise cannot be that Mike correctly answered this question in the past 
as that would, again, imply that John already knew or was justified in believing 
that Amanita phalloides is toxic.  
So, such appeals must involve the extrapolation of direct evidence 
concerning Mike’s expertise on issues other than that of the toxicity or non-
toxicity of Amanita phalloides. This sort of appeal would include appealing to 
inductive evidence concerning Mike’s expertise as if John is really ignorant of the 
facts concerning the toxicity or non-toxicity of Amanita phalloides, then his prior 
evidence concerning Mike’s expertise cannot be that Mike correctly answered this 
question in the past as that would, again, imply that John already knew that 
Amanita phalloides is toxic. However, this does not work in all cases, as John may 
not, in point of fact, actually have direct evidence concerning Mike’s expertise on 
the toxicity or non-toxicity of mushrooms other than Amanita phalloides. 
Moreover, it is not at all clear that Mike’s expertise concerning the toxicity or 
non-toxicity of Amanita bisporigera has evidential significance with respect to his 
expertise on the toxicity of Amanita phalloides. The sort of evidential 
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extrapolation principle required to underwrite this view seems dubious to say the 
least. It would have to take the form of some sort of principle to the effect that 
justified belief about A’s expertise with respect to p support belief about A’s 
expertise with respect to issues relevantly similar to p. Consider the following 
charitable rendering of such a principle, where Sim(x,y) establishes a relevant 
similarity relation between propositions: 
(EEP) JBAKBp  JBAKBq, for all p, q such that Sim(p, q). 
But, such a principle is doomed to intolerably vague with respect to the 
similarity relation and it seems obvious that this principle simply does not always 
hold. For example, Mike may never have even heard of Amanita bisporigera and 
so would know nothing about its toxicity even though we may suppose that he 
knows that everything there is to know with respect to Amanita phalloides’ 
dangerous toxicity. 
A second possible, but ultimately unsatisfactory, solution apparently open 
to internalist evidentialists of this sort would be to appeal to justification as 
coherence.11 This would, in effect, appear to render moot any need for a principle 
like EEP. What an interalist evidentialist of this sort might be inclined to say is 
that the problem of establishing the bona fides of appeal to expert testimony 
indicates is that while internalism, mentalism and evidentialism should be 
retained, accessibilism can be ceded. Of course, this is due at least in part to the 
well-known problem of our inability to effectively compute coherence.12 But, 
nevertheless, such a view would prima facie appear to allow that John is justified 
in believing Mike’s testimony that Amanita phalloides is poisonous provided his 
believing Mike’s testimony yields a more coherent total belief state than that 
produced by his believing that Amanita phalloides is not poisonous. But, it is hard 
to see how John can be reasonably sure that accepting Mike’s testimony or any 
testimony does, in fact, yield the more coherent belief system if John is truly 
ignorant of the facts concerning the issue of the toxicity of Amanita phalloides.  
Moreover, it is not at all clear that this sort of tactic would underwrite a 
general principle to the effect that we should a priori accept testimony, even of 
the aggregate sort, as evidentially significant. It may be true that taking testimony 
at face value produces the most coherent belief system, but testimony may not, 
even generally, be true. Whether accepting testimony as a source of evidence 
                                                                
11 Bovens and Hartmann appear to defend such a view in Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann, 
Bayesian Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
12 See Hilary Kornblith, “The Unattainability of Coherence,” in The Current State of the 
Coherence Theory, ed. John W. Bender (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989) and Paul Thagard, 
Coherence in Thought and Action (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). 
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produces a more coherent system of beliefs is a matter of fact to be determined a 
posteriori if we take coherence justification to be truth-indicative. The connection 
between justification and truth cannot be fixed by coherence without appeal to 
further evidence concerning the frequency of veracity of testimony. Nevertheless, 
such general facts about testimony do not appear to able to underwrite John’s 
believing that Mike knows the answer to the specific question of the toxicity or 
non-toxicity of Amanita phalloides without implying that John already knows 
that Amanita phalloides is toxic.  
What are we then to conclude about appeals to expertise and testimony? If 
we accept internalism and evidentialism and reductivism, it would seem to be the 
case that such appeals may simply be epistemically worthless when we begin from 
a position of complete ignorance concerning some matter of fact. As a result, it 
may simply turn out that from a position of total ignorance, the only way to 
credibly resolve such an epistemic dearth is to seek direct evidence from a 
sufficiently reliable source. It also suggests, in accord with more skeptical 
intuitions, that we may not, in point of fact, have as much knowledge as we 
suppose because testimony may not provide justification. The most promising 
option open to internalist evidentialists who also accept reductivism might then 
be to claim that what we possess based on authority in far greater numbers are 
propositions that we merely accept (i.e. propositions that we entertain for 
pragmatic reasons without epistemic justification), especially in cases where the 
consequences of making a mistake are not too practically dire.13 What, in turn, 
this suggests more generally is that pragmatic and contextual factors might play a 
useful role in demarcating testimonial acceptance from justified beliefs based on 
testimony. To achieve the latter sort of epistemic states without falling prey to 
viscous regress we are required to establish, by appeal to direct evidence, that the 
testimony comes from an expert source in order to avoid falling prey to the 
inability to discriminate Ad Verecundiam pseudo-justifications from legitimate 
appeals to authority. Curiously, this does appear to render such appeals 
epistemically superfluous, and so shows that the allegedly overlooked centrality of 
testimony in epistemologies that accept these three principles will be spurious.14  
In order to avoid such worries what other defenders of the epistemic 
basicality of testimony have done is to attempt to cast cases of pragmatic 
                                                                
13 This, of course, would be no comfort to Jamesians who reject evidentialism and argue that 
belief can be rational despite one’s having insufficient evidence in sufficiently grave cases. What 
this discussion suggests is that James is, perhaps, confusing acceptance and belief. 
14 See Robert Audi, “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification,” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 405-422 on the overlooked role of testimony. 
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acceptance in an artificially positive light by appeal to an exceptionally weak 
standard of justification, a standard so weak that it is in fact no standard at all. This 
brings us to the second possible option open to internalist evidentialists discussed 
earlier. Perhaps internalism and evidentialism can be maintained if one is willing 
to simply reject reductionism and accept that testimony is a basic, justification-
generating, epistemic source. Doing so would seem to imply that our reliance of 
testimony does not require our establishing the frequency of veracity of various 
testimonial sources and so might well avoid the problem of the superfluousness of 
testimony by treating testimonial warrant as an a priori matter.  
4. The Failure of Internalist Evidentialist Non-Reductivism 
In this vein Burge and Hardwig would have us accept that all testimony is 
justificatory absent some reason to believe otherwise, absent any defeaters with 
respect to that testimony, and the only apparent reason they seem to do so is in 
order to avoid having to draw the conclusion that we possess far less knowledge 
than we might suppose.15 This is troubling in and of itself as it rather clearly begs 
the question against the skeptic, but as we shall other problems arise for non-
reductivist version of internalist evidentialism as well. To begin, consider Burge’s 
infamous trust principle: 
(TP) A person is a priori entitled to accept a proposition that is taken to be 
presented as true and that is seemingly intelligible to him, unless there are 
stronger reasons not to do so.16 
Now surely this would amount to a rejection of evidentialism if we read 
“reasons” as epistemic reasons and so would be unacceptable to the many garden-
variety internalists who accept mentalism and accessibilism. Nevertheless, Burge 
argues that this is the essence of the non-reductivist view and that testimony is 
basic in the sense that it does not require appeal to other sources of justification 
(induction in particular) in order to provide justificatory support. The core idea 
behind this view is that testimony is a basic source of evidence capable not only of 
generating and increasing justification, but also of generating knowledge 
independent of empirical concerns and it seems as if this will be true presumably 
even if we are unaware of TP.17  
                                                                
15 See Burge, “Content Preservation,” “Interlocution, Perception,” and Hardwig, “The Role of 
Trust.” 
16 Burge, “Interlocution, Perception,” 45. 
17 So the view Burge endorses seems as if it is a sort of deontological internalist view and so does 
not include accepting accessibilism. It is not clear to me whether he endorses mentalism or not. 
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Putting the deeply controversial issue of whether testimonial justification 
can generate knowledge aside, it seems to be clear that if this position is 
maintained, then evidentialism, as it is ordinarily understood, must be given up 
and, as a result, this view amounts to nothing more than capriciousness about 
justification by testimony. This point can be usefully seen by once again adopting 
the standard probabilistic theory of justification as confirming evidence. Consider 
the case where we suppose that JBJohn(KMikep  KMikep) because of TP and that, as 
a result, JBJohnp. But in the case we have been looking at, prior to Mike’s testimony 
that p, TMikep, John is ignorant of the truth about (p  p) and so relative to John 
P(p) = .5 if he is rational. By Bayes’ theorem P(pe) = P(p)P(ep)/P(e) and to 
violate either this theorem or the principle of conditionaliztion that governs 
probabilistic belief updating is to invite probabilistic incoherence and is thus ipso 
facto irrational.18  
Given the explicit constraints endorsed by non-reductivist internalist like 
Burge, it is easy to see that it is not possible that TMikep could raise the probability 
of p relative to John from his stipulated state of ignorance. Consider John’s state 
after Mike’s testimony in terms of Bayes’ theorem: P(pTMikep) = 
P(p)P(TMikepp)/P(TMikep). P(TMikep) = 1 if we simply stipulate 8 and assume that it 
is true that Mike tells John that Amanita phalloides is toxic. We also know that if 
2 and 3 are stipulated as true then, provided he is rational, relative to John P(p) = 
.5. Substituting this information in our application of Bayes’ theorem then yields: 
P(pTMikep) = .5P(TMikepp). As a result, the only way that John’s justification for 
his belief that p can alter from the initial state of ignorance is due to the posterior 
probability in that expression, P(TMikepp). The problem is then that the posterior 
probability in question is a conditional probability about the frequency of truth of 
Mike’s testimony that p conditional on the truth of p! But, non-reductivists are 
committed to the view that testimony is a basic form of justification and that this 
basicality is to be understood as the ability to generate justification without appeal 
to inductive frequencies about the veracity of testimony. So the choice is clear and 
forced, internalists cannot be both non-reductivists and evidentialists.19 
Essentially, in rejecting reductionism non-reductivists of the internalist sort open 
themselves to the charge that any alteration in the probability of a proposition 
                                                                
18 On conditionalizing and incoherence see Paul Teller, “Conditionalization and Observation,” 
Synthese 26 (1973): 218-258 and Bas Van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989). 
19 The other possibility is simply to reject the standard probabilistic theories of justification, but 
this seems to be an unreasonably high price to pay in order to maintain the basicality of 
testimony. 
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justified solely on the basis of testimony is nothing more than an arbitrary re-
assignment of a prior probability P(p) to some value greater than .5 and so must 
ipso facto be probabilistically incoherent as it does so independent of evidence 
and, more worrisome yet, in doing so it also runs afoul of endorsing Moorean 
contradictions of the following form: I believe that p, but I have insufficient 
evidence that p.20  
If all of this weren’t bad enough, accepting TP would also be an exceedingly 
stupid epistemic policy for someone in a situation like John’s to follow. John’s 
intention is, ex hypothesi, to eat the mushroom if he is told that it is not toxic and 
to refrain from eating it if is toxic. So John needs to be very careful and as a result 
needs to adopt sufficiently stringent standards of evidence with respect to Mike’s 
expert testimony.21 He needs to adopt standards that exceed those required for 
mere acceptance of a proposition, the state of entertaining a proposition as a basis 
for action or reasoning, and sufficient for at least well-justified belief.22 Bare 
acceptance appears to require only that one adopt a proposition as a basis for 
acting or reasoning, whereas rational acceptance may require only weak pragmatic 
justification, but rational belief requires epistemic justification, especially when 
there are pragmatic reasons to suppose that rational acceptance is too weak given 
the agent’s contextual situation.23 Bare trust then is insufficient for establishing 
belief for internalist evidentialists, although it may well play a role in fixing 
acceptance. The defenders of the epistemic basicality of testimony who are 
internalists appear simply beg the question against the skeptic and to concede 
evidentialism in order to maintain internalism and non-reductivism and they do 
in a way that is patently irrational from both the epistemic and pragmatic 
perspectives.  
                                                                
20 See Adler, “The Ethics of Belief” on this point. 
21 See Fricker, “Against Gullibility,” on this point. 
22 See L. Jonathan Cohen, An Essay on Belief and Acceptance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 
Michael J. Shaffer, “The Privacy of Belief, Morality and Epistemic Norms,” Social Epistemology 
20 (2006): 41-54, “Three Problematic Theories of Conditional Acceptance,” Logos & Episteme 
(2011): 117-125, “Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-contravening 
Commitments,” American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2013): 73-82, “Epistemic Paradox and the 
Logic of Acceptance,” Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 25 (2013): 
337-353, “A Thoroughly Modern Wager,” Logos & Episteme 8 (2017): 207-231 (2017), and 
Robert Audi, “The A Priori Authority of Testimony,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 18-34 for 
discussion of the difference between belief and acceptance. 
23 Another possibility is that one might suppose that pragmatic reasons might raise S’s degree of 
belief that p and lower his degree of belief that p, but Zemach has shown that it is not possible 
to maintain this view because practical reasons cannot increase the probability of a belief. See 
Eddy Zemach, “Pragmatic Reasons for Belief?” Nous 4 (1997): 525-527 for details. 
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5. Conclusion 
Given the inadequacies of both of these views something obviously has to give. On 
the one hand, the most reasonable suggestion for those who wish to retain some 
substantive role for testimony in epistemology would perhaps be to cede 
internalism proper, the view that one’s justificatory status is a function of states 
internal to the epistemic agent, and mentalism, the view that justifiers are mental 
items, in favor of a view that incorporates externalism, and perhaps some weaker 
form of evidentialism and/or accessibilism.24 For example, establishing the 
epistemic bona fides of expert testimony is neither problematic nor is testimony 
incoherent or superfluous for garden-variety reliabilists. On such views Mike’s 
testimony that Amanita phalloides is poisonous is reliable and John should believe 
it just in case he has reason to believe that Mike is reliable. He will have good 
accessible reasons to believe that Mike is reliable just in case he has evidence that 
supports the view that Mike is reliable in this regard and he will have good 
evidence to the effect that Mike’s testimony is reliable just in case that evidence 
was produced by a reliable source. On the other hand, one might just be tempted 
to reject the view that testimony ever provides justification and that, irrespective 
of what Mike says, John should seek some direct evidence about the toxicity of the 
Amanita before ever considering ingesting it. 
 
                                                                
24 Steup discusses of the compatibility of externalism and accessibilism in Matthias Steup, 
“Epistemic Duty, Evidence and Internality,” in Knowledge, Truth and Duty, ed. Matthias Steup 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
